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Abstract: Columbia University announced the Adam Mickiewicz Chair in Philology, Lan-
guage and Literature in May, 1948, during the Cold War. The Chair’s incumbent would be 
Manfred Kridl, an émigré who had left Poland 1940, and the communist Warsaw govern-
ment would contribute $10,000 annually. Polish Ambassador Josep Winiewicz, with the 
assistance of Czeslaw Milosz, had suggested Kridl. Arthur Coleman, an Assistant Profes-
sor of Slavic Languages, and the Polish-American Congress loudly protested the appoint-
ment, “This infiltration of the Communist voice.” The Polish-American press agreed. The 
controversy received nationwide attention when Coleman resigned and asserted that Po-
land, controlled by Moscow and the Comintern, would wage a campaign of “academic in-
filtration” with the Mickiewicz Chair. Sigmund Sluszka, a former Coleman student, called 
Kridl “a noted Marxist.” “The New York Times” gave the resignation front-page coverage, 
and the media emphasized that Columbia was “a Hot-Bed of Communism.” The fact that 
World War II hero, Dwight D. Eisenhower, had just become the university’s president in-
creased public interest in the controversy, even though the decision on the Chair had been 
made before his arrival. Columbia’s Provost launched an extensive investigation into the ac-
cusations against Kridl and two professors, and Eisenhower presented the confidential re-
port to the University’s Trustees. Columbia stood by her support of the Chair and Kridl.
The protest lasted throughout the summer, and several university officials had ques-
tioned accepting the funding from Warsaw. While the controversy had undermined the Pol-
ish Studies program for the Polish-American and émigré communities, the Provost believed 
that the Adam Mickiewicz Chair and Professor Kridl contributed to the furthering of Pol-
ish-American Studies in America.
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Streszczenie: Uniwersytet Columbia ogłosił powstanie katedry literatury polskiej im. Ada-
ma Mickiewicza w maju 1948 roku, w czasie zimnej wojny. Katedrę objął Manfred Kridl, 
który wyemigrował z Polski w 1940 roku, natomiast komunistyczny rząd polski miał prze-
kazywać katedrze 10 000 dolarów rocznie. Osobę Kridla zaproponowali ambasador Polski 
Józef Winiewicz oraz Czesław Miłosz. Arthur Coleman, profesor slawistyki, oraz Kongres 
Polonii Amerykańskiej stanowczo zaprotestowali przeciwko tej nominacji, „infiltracji ko-
munistycznego głosu”. Protest poparła prasa Polonii amerykańskiej. Kontrowersja zwróciła 
uwagę świata, kiedy Coleman zrezygnował ze stanowiska, oświadczając, że poprzez katedrę 
im. Adama Mickiewicza Polska, kontrolowana przez Moskwę i Komintern, będzie prowa-
dzić kampanię „infiltracji akademickiej”. Sigmund Sluszka, były student Colemana, nazwał 
Kridla „znanym marksistą”. Dziennik „The New York Times” zamieścił relację o rezygnacji 
na pierwszej stronie, a media stwierdziły, że Uniwersytet Columbia jest „wylęgarnią komu-
nizmu”. Zainteresowanie kontrowersją zwiększył fakt, że bohater drugiej wojny światowej, 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, właśnie został rektorem uniwersytetu, mimo iż decyzja o utwo-
rzeniu katedry zapadła jeszcze przed nadejściem jego kadencji. Administrator Uniwersyte-
tu Columbia zarządził szczegółowe dochodzenie w sprawie oskarżeń przeciwko Kridlowi 
i dwóm profesorom, a Eisenhower przedstawił tajny raport zarządowi uczelni. Uniwersytet 
nie wycofał swego poparcia dla katedry i Kridla.
Protest trwał przez całe lato i część władz uniwersyteckich zakwestionowała finansowa-
nie katedry przez Warszawę. Mimo iż kontrowersja sprawiła, że środowiska Polonii amery-
kańskiej i emigrantów zaczęły negatywnie patrzeć na studia polonistyczne na Uniwersytecie 
Columbia, administrator uczelni uważał, że katedra literatury polskiej im. Adama Mickie-
wicza i profesor Kridl przyczynili się do rozwoju studiów polonistycznych w Ameryce.
Słowa kluczowe: Thomas Anessi, Stanislaus Blejwas, Arthur Coleman, Dwight D. Eisen-
hower, Frank Fackenthal, Robert C. Harron, Albert C. Jacobs, Roman Jakobson, Manfred 
Kridl, katedra im. Adama Mickiewicza, Czesław Miłosz, Kongres Polonii Amerykańskiej, 
Arthur Hays Sulzberger, Ernest Simmons, Sigmund Sluszka, R. Gordon Wasson, Józef Wi-
niewicz
In November, 1946, a year and a half after the end of WW II in Europe and 
a year and a half before the Adam Mickiewicz Chair controversy, Columbia’s 
Acting President Frank Fackenthal announced the Thomas G. Masaryk Chair 
of Czechoslovak Studies at an elaborate dinner in honor of Masaryk’s son, 
Jan. “We have a special obligation,” Fackenthal declared, to promote “an un-
derstanding of nations and peoples (...). By such mutual understanding can 
we best serve the cause of both learning and peace among the peoples of the 
world.” Jan Masaryk, Prague’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, noted “Hitler came 
within an ace of winning (...). The result of all this is a changed Europe, a sick 
Europe.” The Czechoslovak people must “accommodate ourselves to the situ-
ation (...). We need understanding and help and we count on it from the founts 
of learning in the United States, such as Columbia University.” The Czech 
Under-Secretary of State, a prominent member of the Czech Communist Par-
ty also spoke; he would succeed Masaryk after the February, 1948 coup d’état 
and Masaryk’s “defenestration.”
Professor Ernest Simmons, the executive officer of East European Lan-
guages, had played a major role in establishing the Chair, and he emphasized 















nations.” He hoped other Slavic governments – the Czech, Polish, and Yu-
goslav Ambassadors attended the dinner, as did the Consul-General of the 
U.S.S.R. – would also “facilitate full cultural exchanges.” The Masaryk Chair, 
he added, “will help make Columbia a center of Czechoslovak studies. It had 
been discussed with the State Department, and the Prague Government al-
ready had given $7,500. Professor Roman Jakobson, a Slavic philologist and 
on the Columbia faculty since 1943, would hold the Chair. Born in Russia, 
he had left for Czechoslovakia in 1920 and escaped from Prague in 1939, ar-
riving in New York in 1941.2
Following the successful establishment of the Masaryk Chair, the Uni-
versity had little reason to anticipate controversy when the Polish Ambassa-
dor, Josep Winiewicz, proposed in 1948 a chair by his communist govern-
ment. Simmons, who had been negotiating with the Ambassador for nearly 
two years, used the Masaryk Chair for a model. 
For an outside observer in 1948, the announcement in 1947 of General 
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s appointment as Columbia’s president had generat-
ed worldwide publicity for the university. Columbia had held a highly suc-
cessful Special Convocation for America’s WWII leaders, and G.I.’s, with 
some 14,000 registering in the fall of 1946, were flocking to the campus.3 The 
country was recovering from the postwar recession.
Why, then, did a prominent Trustee call these years the “dark days” for 
Columbia?4 Why did a reference to a “New York Times” review last year of 
former president Michael Sovern’s Sixty Years at Columbia, assert “Columbia 
University began the second half of the 20th Century in decline, bottoming 
out with the student riots of the 1960’s.”5 What was the situation on Morn-
ingside Heights at the time of the Mickiewicz Chair controversy? 
As WWII ended, critical issues demanded the Administration’s attention, 
particularly a rapidly mounting budget deficit and the lack of presidential lead-
ership. President Nicholas Murray Butler’s fund-raising literally had stopped 
in the early 1930’s. Groundbreaking for the last new structure, South Library, 
now Butler Library, had occurred in 1932; maintenance on aging-buildings had 
been deferred for years. Butler, with his eye-sight badly failing, was nearly deaf; 
he had ignored an opportunity to retire in 1932, on his 70th birthday, his 50th 
Reunion at Columbia, and his 30th year as President. During the World War II 
Columbia lost prominent faculty, including Nobel Prize winners Harold Urey 
and Enrico Fermi. Butler had appointed every Trustee; finally, two Trustees 
2 Columbia Press Release for November 21, 1948 newspapers, A.C. Jacobs MSS., Michi-
gan Historical Collections (MHC), Bentley Historical Library, Univ. of Michigan.
3 R.A. McCaughey, Stand, Columbia, Columbia University Press, 2003, p. 350.
4 L.D. Egbert to A.C. Jacobs, January 30, 1950, MHC.
5 M. Sovern, An Improbable Life: My Sixty Years at Columbia and Other Adventures, 
Columbia University Press, 2014.














asked him to retire in 1945. For decades he had been the prevailing voice in the 
country’s academic leadership; in post-war America, Columbia’s voice was miss-
ing. As Barnard’s Robert McCaughey asked in Stand, Columbia, “Would post-
war Columbia be able to attract – and retain – world-class faculty?”6
Nowhere was that problem more evident than in the long, drawn out 
search for Butler’s successor. Stories circulated with names of prominent lead-
ers who expressed no interest and, then, the “New York Times” published 
an embarrassing article about another search failure. As pressures mount-
ed after two years and, amid considerable confusion, IBM’s Tom Watson, 
a Trustee not on the search committee, arranged to meet General Eisenhower. 
Sufficiently encouraged, he made sweeping promises. Bluntly, Eisenhower 
“wouldn’t have anything to do with curriculum, or faculty, or any of that sort 
of thing,” including fund-raising! Incredible, yes! Even more incredible, this 
commitment was not conveyed to the Broad of Trustees before it selected 
him! This mistake led to many misunderstandings on Morningside Heights; 
and, unfortunately, he would not arrive for one year. The Trustees appointed 
Professor of Law Albert C. Jacobs the Provost. He had served for a year as As-
sistant to the President under Fackenthal; they told him he would “be in com-
plete charge of the whole academic program at Columbia.”
Eisenhower arrived on Morningside Heights on May 3, 1948 – two days 
before Columbia accepted the Adam Mickiewicz Chair proposal – and he did 
not become president until June 7, after Commencement. He brought with 
him several military assistants, and his office took on a Pentagon chief-of-staff 
organization. In addition, he asked the Trustees to give him a special assistant, 
Kevin McCann, who was working with the General on his wartime memoirs, 
Crusade in Europe. At Columbia he would handle Eisenhower’s correspond-
ence and write speeches. Quickly, he assumed authority over the office. Ac-
cording to a Trustee who knew the aides, they “didn’t know anything about 
the University,” and they made the President inaccessible for the faculty. They 
were “still protecting a world figure,” Fackenthal recalled, “instead of putting 
him into a new community.” 
Eisenhower must have realized, nonetheless, that the year Columbia waited 
for him had been difficult for the large University. Because of the continu-
ing large budget deficit and no fund-raising program, the Provost saw no al-
ternative to a tuition increase that angered students. The “Columbia Specta-
tor” and veterans, especially, launched a protest that lasted throughout the 
1948 spring semester, and prompted the Dean of the College to say “We have 
stubbed our toe.”
In addition, Eisenhower inadvertently became associated with a freedom 
of speech controversy and the issue of communism on campus. Harsh press 
6 T.B. Jacobs, Eisenhower at Columbia, Transactions Publishers, 2001, Ch. 1; 















and radio criticism had occurred when Provost Jacobs in December denied 
permission for the communist Howard Fast to speak to students, declaring “no 
convicted person” should have “the privilege of the University forum to argue 
his case.” Fast, the author of Freedom Road and Citizen Thomas Paine, was ap-
pealing his conviction on a contempt citation by the House Un-American Ac-
tivities Committee. Students and liberals supported the “Spectator’s” headline: 
“Columbia Provost Denies Freedom of Speech,” and critics argued that “the Uni-
versity’s action was prompted by the threat” of the Committee turning its “at-
tention to the Columbia campus.” Jacobs had added that Columbia would 
honor the student request when Fast “is cleared under the law” – which it did 
four months later. The city universities followed Columbia’s ban.7 
Meanwhile, Columbia had allowed the legislative director of the Com-
munist Party to speak in Pupin Hall on campus. This prompted the benefac-
tor’s daughter to request the removal her father’s name from the building. She 
was not mollified by the Provost’s reply; consequently, her husband asked Ei-
senhower, who had just arrived on campus, “Will Columbia agree to keep 
traitors out of Pupin Hall?” Columbia had been sensitive to the issue of com-
munist influence on campus since the 1930’s and saw a chance to address the 
recent publicity with a reply from Eisenhower. On May 25 Eisenhower, after 
writing he had been at the University only for three weeks and did not know 
the specifics, declared he had “a passionate belief in the American political 
plan (...). The values of our system will never be fully appreciated by us and 
our children unless we also understand the essentials of opposing ideologies.” 
Columbia sent this letter to alumni.8
This occurred on the eve of the country’s Democratic and Republican 
presidential nominating conventions and, with an Eisenhower “boom” gain-
ing momentum, he probably could have had either party’s nomination for 
president.
During the conventions, Jacobs recalled, “He had his office blinds pulled” 
because of reporters and curiosity seekers outside. The national political spec-
ulation disrupted the University and preoccupied Eisenhower into mid-July, 
when he went to Vermont for a week. In late July he left for Colorado until 
after Labor Day. He “should have been around” that summer, the Provost re-
called, “and he wasn’t.”9
These dates – Eisenhower’s arrival in early May and not becoming pres-
ident until June 7th – refute an assertion by Thomas Anessi. When discuss-
ing the Adam Mickiewicz Chair in a recent article, he wrote “All of these in-
7 For the previous paragraphs, see: T.B. Jacobs, Eisenhower at Columbia, op. cit., Ch. 1–3.
8 D.D. Eisenhower to L.G. Smith, May 25, 1948, CACU; The Papers of Dwight David 
Eisenhower: Columbia University, ed. L. Galambos, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984, 
X, 84–87 (PDDE).
9 For the previous paragraphs, see T.B. Jacobs, Eisenhower at Columbia, op. cit.














stitutions,” referring also to the Russian Institute and the reorganization of 
the Slavic Languages programs, “reflected the political priorities of the uni-
versity’s first cold-war president, former general and future U.S. President, 
Dwight Eisenhower.”10 Impossible. He was not at Columbia then. But, like 
the communism controversy on his arrival, he would become associated with 
the Adam Mickiewicz protest. The Polish-American and émigré communities 
blamed Eisenhower for the Polish Chair decision, and Eisenhower’s conserva-
tive critics saw the opportunity to attack him.
In April, 1948, Polish Ambassador Josep Winiewicz, after long negotia-
tions with Professor Simmons and the Professor’s encouraging discussions 
with the State Department, proposed a chair for Polish Studies in honor that 
country’s famous poet, Adam Mickiewicz.11 On May 5th Acting President Fac-
kenthal in a letter to Winiewicz accepted the proposal for the Adam Mickie-
wicz Chair in Philology, Language and Literature for a three-year trial period. 
Warsaw would contribute $10,000 annually. Fackenthal stated that Columbia 
had the privilege of making the appointment and the incumbent “of so distin-
guished a chair” would be Manfred Kridl, a professor of Polish literature. Kridl, 
an émigré, had left Poland in 1940 and taught at Smith College since 1941. 
Columbia envisioned this first Polish Chair in America as leading to “a nation-
al center (...) in building closer educational and cultural ties between our two 
nations.” The Ambassador handed Fackenthal a $5000 check on May 20.
Columbia had control over the appointment but, while Fackenthal and 
the Provost would insist throughout that the incumbent was named “with-
out any suggestion or advice from outside sources.” The suggestion, however, 
had come from Winiewicz with approval by the Polish Government and the 
University. In the negotiations with Simmons, Winiewicz had assistance from 
Czeslaw Milosz, the Polish Cultural Attaché and poet, who had been a student 
of Kridl’s in Poland. He had visited him in Northampton and advocated him 
for the Chair. In pre-war Poland Kirdl had been a liberal and anti-Catholic critic 
of the Polish government; consequently, a great number Polish-Americans and 
émigrés reacted negatively when they learned about his appointment.12
10 S.J. Blejwas, Two Chairs in Polish Studies (and the Space Between) at Columbia University, 
www.academia.edu/10341951/Stanislaus_Blejwas_and_Two_Chairs_in_Polish_Studies_and_
the_Space_Between_at_Columbia_University, accessed: 25.02.2016.
11 On September 20, 1948, Eisenhower wrote confidentially to the Trustees that the Chief 
of the Eastern Division of the State Department told Simmons, speaking unofficially, that the 
Department would be “sympathetic to any attempt” to develop such studies, “especially so in 
the case of Poland,” as long as Columbia had “complete control over the selection” of teachers 
and “the subjects taught.” CACU.
12 F. Fackenthal to J. Winiewicz, May 5, 1948, Central Archives, Columbia University 
(CACU); PDDE, X, 141; S.J. Blajwas, The Adam Mickiewicz Chair of Polish Culture: Colum-
bia University and the Cold War (1948–1954) (Part 1), “The Polish Review” 1991, Vol. 36, 















Over Memorial Day Weekend, probably Saturday, May 29, a delegation 
from the Polish-American Congress (PAC), which ardently opposed the com-
munist regime in Warsaw, called on Provost Jacobs, who had not been in-
volved in the Chair’s negotiations. They were, he remembered, “respectfully 
requesting” that Columbia rescind its acceptance of the Polish grant. The 
Provost refused, stating that the University already was “fully committed,” 
and he emphasized the University’s long-standing commitment “of further-
ing the study of peoples and cultures in various area of the world.” He later 
recalled: “The meeting was most cordial as was its ending.” Then the “fire-
works began.”13
The “New York Times” reported on June 1st, Columbia’s Commencement, 
that the PAC, at its meeting in Philadelphia, had sent on May 31 a telegram to 
Eisenhower, who still was not president. It urged him to reject the $5000 for 
the Chair, asserting that the funding and Kridl’s teaching were “not compat-
ible with the high patriotic ideas of the American student of Polish descent. 
(...). This infiltration of the Communist Voice is anti-American.” Fackenthal, 
in Columbia’s first public statement on the Chair, mentioned that the gift was 
on a trail basis and that it would promote interest in the Polish language and 
culture; moreover, it conformed to the University’s policy of “furthering the 
study of peoples and cultures of the various areas.”14
With the telegram the protest had reached the “New York Times”, and 
throughout June the Polish-American press supported the PAC’s position. 
According to the scholar Stanislaus Blajwas, “The PAC protest was orches-
trated by Sigmund Sluszka (...). Sluszka, in turn, received his information 
from [Arthur] Coleman.” Coleman, an Assistant Professor of Slavic Languag-
es at Columbia, had been involved with the Chair’s discussions. A Columbia 
Ph.D. and an Instructor from 1928 to 1946 – before the “up or out” policy 
– he also was secretary-treasurer of the American Association of Teachers of 
Slavic and East European Languages. Sluszka, a former Coleman student, was 
a Queens College Instructor and high school teacher. He would continue to 
fan the flames.15
On July 1 Coleman, unsuccessful in his protests, resigned in a letter to 
Eisenhower, and he sent a copy to Simmons. He had to object to funds from 
the communist government paying his colleague’s salary, or else he would 
be “conniving at the sort of intellectual ‘collaboration’” by professors who 
stayed “during Hitler’s regime.” Moreover, he could not accept any associa-
tion of Mickiewicz with the communist government in Warsaw, especially 
since he and his wife were working on a biography of the poet. He could not 
face her or his students “if I succumbed to the subtle pressures coming out 
13 A.C. Jacobs, “Memoirs,” Unpublished, 1974, p. 166, author’s possession.
14 „The New York Times,” June 1, 1948.
15 S.J. Blejwas, Adam Mickiewicz Chair..., op. cit., p. 328.














of Poland today to make Adam Mickiewicz a kind of Polish John the Bap-
tist for the regime’s version of ‘authentic Polish Marxism.’” Nor could he sup-
port this “Greek gift” from a Marxist regime that advocated overthrowing the 
American government and “denies basic voting and the elementary demo-
cratic rights.” Poland, controlled by Moscow and the Comintern, would wage 
a campaign of “academic infiltration” with the Mickiewicz Chair.16
The resignation letter “surprised” Simmons and triggered a series of letters 
with the administration. He reminded Coleman that during the two years of 
discussions about the Chair, Coleman never had objected to the proposal. Per-
haps Simmons knew that in 1941 Coleman had wondered if he could get Kridl 
to come to Columbia, when he wrote “I need your help here also.” In any event, 
Simmons knew that they had had a friendly relationship. Later, Professor Ja-
kobson, who had had several conversations with the Provost, informed him that 
Coleman, if the Polish Chair were established, had wanted support for his can-
didacy. Simmons also wrote to the Provost. He criticized his colleague’s teaching 
– the enrollments were small – and his scholarship and commitment, adding 
that he had not made a “name for himself among Slavists.” The Provost replied 
he would meet Coleman before accepting the resignation.17
While anticipating the meeting, had Coleman, a minor figure at Colum-
bia, lost perspective and exaggerated his position on campus? Did he see his 
resignation as an opportunity to create widespread publicity? Whatever his 
concerns about communist infiltration in his department, did he realize how 
badly the controversy could damage Polish Studies at Columbia? Had he lost 
all sense of reality? He certainly had to realize that his demands would be un-
acceptable to Columbia University. On July 9, he told the Provost he would 
only withdraw his resignation letter if Eisenhower investigated communism at 
Columbia, withdrew Professor Kridl’s appointment, and authorized Coleman 
to use $5000 of the Polish grant for the purchase of scientific materials for 
universities in Poland. On Sunday, July 11, before receiving a reply, he held 
a press conference at which he released copies of his resignation letter, and he 
told the media that Kridl would be spreading Poland’s communist propagan-
da to students.18
“The New York Times” announced on the front-page the next morning: 
“Quits Columbia Job Over Polish Grant: Dr. Coleman Charges Moscow Con-
trols Fund for Study Chair With ‘Infiltration’ Aim.” The article continued on 
page five with three columns and Coleman’s photo. He discussed his resigna-
16 PDDE, X, 140; A. Coleman to D.D. Eisenhower, July 1, 1948, CACU; “New York 
Times,” July 12, 1948.
17 S.J. Blejwas, Adam Mickiewicz Chair..., op. cit., p. 330; E. Simmons to A. Coleman, July 3; 
R. Jakobson to A.C. Jacobs, August 23; E. Simmons to A.C. Jacobs, July 3; A.C. Jacobs to 
E. Simmons, July 7, CACU, also mentioned in PDDE, X, 140. 















tion letter, saying he had not had a reply, though he had spoken with the Prov-
ost. His resignation stands, he continued, as long as Columbia accepts money 
that Polish universities need, money that comes “from the gaunt hands of Pol-
ish peasants and workers and even professors, many of whom Mrs. Coleman 
and I used to know and with whom we still sympathize.” In response, Colum-
bia released a statement from the Provost, which stated that Eisenhower would 
act on the resignation soon. Columbia had accepted the grant after careful con-
sideration, and here it erated Fackenthal’s earlier comments about Columbia’s 
purpose with the Polish grant. And, for the first time, the University said Kirdl 
would hold the Chair. During his press conference Coleman had conceded he 
had little hope Columbia would meet his stipulations.19
That evening Sluszka called Kridl “a noted Marxist.” Escalating the level 
of rhetoric, he added: “It is morally wrong for Columbia to take ‘Cominform’ 
money because if Columbia accepts such funds, other colleges will also take 
it, and thus American higher education will then become centers of Commu-
nist training.” Two weeks later Sluszka told a conference: “If Dr. Kridl wishes 
to be an American, he should follow Dr. Coleman’s leadership in this and re-
store the money to those from whom it was taken” – poor Polish peasants.20
That same evening, Kirdl replied from his home in Northampton. After 
saying “I don’t think any comment is necessary,” he added: “Any accusation 
that this chair will be used for political purposes is an affront to Columbia 
University.” It “will be used for teaching Polish literature and language, not 
propaganda. My political opinions are another matter. I don’t see that I have 
to explain anything.”21
Eisenhower the same day accepted the resignation in a letter written by 
the Provost, following his meeting with Coleman. Eisenhower specifically 
supported Kridl’s appointment, and he also addressed the issue of communist 
subversion. “If I ever find that the incumbent of this Chair steps aside from 
his academic assignment to infiltrate our University with philosophies inim-
ical to our American system of government, the Chair will be discontinued.” 
The “Times” published the letter. When Coleman was then interviewed about 
the letter, he denied that Kridl, “paid as he will be, (...) will be able to carry on 
his teaching at Columbia under conditions of true scholarship.” This lack of 
understanding “will grow rather than be diminished by this regrettable deci-
sion of General Eisenhower” on establishing the Mickiewicz Chair.22
Coleman’s press conference had launched a wave of protest the same 
day as Eisenhower’s letter. Newspapers and radio had a field day, led by the 
“Times,” the Associated Press wire service, and other papers in New York 
19 Ibidem.
20 Ibidem; July 30, ibidem.
21 Ibidem.
22 Ibidem.














City. One headline read: “Columbia Provost Supports the Reds – The Uni-
versity is a Hot-Bed of Communism.” An editorial, “Coddling Communists 
at Columbia,” in the “San Francisco Examiner” criticized the Check and Pol-
ish Chairs, and Eisenhower personally for his role in the latter. The newspa-
per added that General Eisenhower had prevented Allied troops from occu-
pying Czechoslovakia in WWII, “Thereby establishing the red flag in central 
Europe.” It attacked Kridl, Jakobson, and Simmons for their Communist 
sympathies. The anti-communist “Counterattack” often drew on New York 
City’s “World-Telegram”, which had a nationally syndicated Red Scare col-
umnist who kept the controversy alive.23
The University still had not addressed the charges that Simmons, Jakob-
son, and Kridl were communist sympathizers. When Sluszka sent to Trus-
tee Arthur Hays Sulzberger, the publisher of the “New York Times,” a file he 
had prepared, “Cominform Infiltration into Columbia,” Sulzberger forward-
ed it to Eisenhower. Sluszka had described himself as a “conscientious Ameri-
can school teacher” and offered himself as a “researcher or ‘subversive data re-
porter’” to gather information for the newspaper on infiltration at Columbia. 
Eisenhower, before he left on vacation, replied in a long letter to Sulzberger 
that “the whole matter [would be] exhaustively examined.” He was giving the 
material to Jacobs “in strictest confidence” with instructions to “develop such 
further facts and statements,” and “if Mr. Jacobs arrives at any conclusion be-
fore I return, he will communicate it to you.”24
The Provost’s extensive investigation during the next few weeks would pro-
vide the material for a confidential, nine-page report Eisenhower sent the Trus-
tees on September 20th. In addition to investigating the accusations about Com-
munist sympathizers at Columbia, particularly Simmons, Jakobson, and Kridl, 
there was the matter of hundreds of letters protesting Kridl’s appointment and 
the acceptance of Coleman’s resignations. Nearly 800 hundred persons had sent 
a form letter, while the seventy-five personal letters would receive an individual 
reply. In both cases Jacobs had assistance from Robert Harron, the University’s 
Director of Public Information, who had excellent working relations with the 
city’s media. Harron, admittedly unhappy about the Polish Chair, undoubtedly 
had quickly prepared Fackenthal’s statement after the PAC’s May 31st telegram 
and the Provost’s statement after Coleman’s press conference.25
23 A.C. Jacobs, “Memoirs,” op. cit., p. 166. For “Counterattack” and the “World Tele-
gram,” see Appendix B, D.D. Eisenhower to Trustees, confidential, September 20, 1948, CACU.
24 D.D. Eisenhower to A.H. Sulzberger, July 27, and to A.C. Jacobs, July 27, 1948, CACU. 
See also footnotes, PDDE, X, 164–166. The file of papers Sluszka sent is in CACU. Eisenhow-
er also instructed the Provost to look “intensively, into plans for reorganization the Universi-
ty’s administration” so he would be “completely prepared” for the October Trustees meeting. 
D.D. Eisenhower to A.C. Jacobs, July 19.
25 A copy of the form letter appeared in the report’s Appendix. D.D. Eisenhower to Trust-















More difficult was the letter that the Provost sent to Professor Simmons 
on August 2. Simmons, considered an academic “fellow-traveler” in the late 
1930’s, had come under attack, and the letter included accusations from the an-
ti-communist newsletter “Counterattack” and an article in the Hearst “World- 
-Telegram.” “I am a bit concerned,” the Professor quickly replied, “that you 
should be disturbed by the attacks on me and Columbia coming from these 
sources.” Asserting, “I am not, and never have been a member of the Com-
munist Party,” he proceeded for two-single spaced pages to address specifical-
ly the charges against him in “Counterattack,” many of which came from an 
article in the “World-Telegram.” He then cited journals in which he was listed 
as an “enemy” of the Soviet Union. Finally, he noted the “insinuations” about 
the Slavic Languages Department and wrote that all twenty members are “ide-
ologically opposed to the Soviet Union.”26
The Provost, meanwhile, had an important conversation in late July with 
R. Gordon Wasson, a Columbia alumnus and an English Instructor for one 
year, and a Vice President in Charge of Public Relations at J.P. Morgan and 
Company. Wasson, who had been “following from the inside rather close-
ly for a long time the evolution of Slavic Studies,” confidentially wrote that 
policy should “favor every effort to cultivate Russia and the satellite countries 
on the study level (...). We should have missed the signals if we had churl-
ishly rejected those funds.” While he had never met Kridl, he had careful-
ly inquired, and “he is absolutely first class.” As for Professor Jakobson, Was-
son had known him for many years, and “he was very emphatic in stating the 
complete loyalty” of him. After the meeting with Jacobs, Wasson wrote to 
Sulzberger that “The University is doing a superb job, quite unique, in this 
field (...). The recent criticisms have been monstrously unfair, in my judg-
ment, and uninformed.”27
Wasson dismissed “Coleman’s dastardly behavior” as “so easily explained,” 
adding that “the public’s memory is so short.” He did not “think the incident 
should give much concern.” He wanted, nonetheless, the Provost to “talk sep-
arately with a number of newspaper persons. When he hoped there would be 
“an opportunity to say something along these line,” Jacobs suggested the pos-
sibility of Eisenhower speaking on “academic freedom and his aversion to var-
ious subversive activities.” Eisenhower, when he returned, liked the idea; he 
26 For academic “fellow-traveler,” see D. Caute, The Fellow Travelers, Yale University Press ,1988, 
p. 88; A.C. Jacobs to E.G. Simmons, August 2, E.G. Simmons to A.C. Jacobs, August 5, and 
D.D. Eisenhower to Trustees, Confidential, September 20, with excerpts from Simmons let-
ter in an appendix, CACU.
27 A.C. Jacobs, confidential memo, July 31; R.G. Wasson to A.C. Jacobs, August 18; 
R.G. Wasson to A.C. Jacobs, July 30, D.D. Eisenhower to Trustees, Confidential, September 20, 
CACU. Wasson had married a Russian pediatrician in 1926; he would become a famous my-
cologist, a Trustee of Barnard College, and a member of the Harvard Visiting Committee to the 
Slavic Department. His CIA file remained closed in 2012, 26 years after his death.














referred to it when he concluded his report to the Trustees. And, significant-
ly, during his Installation Address in October he discussed the importance ac-
ademic freedom.28
The Provost’s investigation served as the confidential nine-page report, plus 
five appendices, that Eisenhower sent to the Trustees on September 20. The at-
tacks against Columbia, he said, raised two issues. Concerning Polish funds for 
the Chair, he cited the University’s position that students would know more 
about a “country that has suffered so much.” After saying that “too much trou-
ble in the world is traceable to a lack of understanding,” he emphasized Was-
son’s comments that Columbia “is doing a superb job, almost unique.”29
Then Eisenhower turned to the second issue, the accusations about the 
three professors and asserted “there have been many unwarranted and vicious 
charges made against the University (...). So far as the public is concerned” it 
had “to maintain a dignified silence.” (He might have added he would have 
liked to reply to certain accusations himself.) He criticized the motives of 
Coleman and Sluszka and described Sluszka as the “spearhead” of the pro-
tests. He discussed how Sluszka had misquoted a letter from an American 
woman, Anne Waterman, who had returned from teaching in Poland for two 
years. As for Sluszka’s “misstatements,” he referred to a detailed letter from Ja-
kobson that he included in the report’s appendix.30
Eisenhower expressed his conviction that Simmons was not, as charged, 
“a communist sympathizer.” It was “not unnatural” for Simmons to have cul-
tivated contacts in Soviet Russia over the years; that did not make him disloy-
al. He had included Simmons’s letter in an appendix and declared that Was-
son was “not really concerned about any difficulty” for Simmons. Wasson also 
had emphasized Jakobson’s loyalty and considered Kridl an excellent choice. 
The Provost, moreover, had had several conversations with Kridl. Years later, 
Jacobs recalled: “There was not a scintilla of evidence that he had any com-
munist leanings.”31
Eisenhower concluded he could not guarantee Columbia had no com-
munist sympathizers, but he guaranteed the University would “not be used 
as a forum to instill into our students philosophical inimical to jour form of 
government. I am confident that none of the professors (...) is disloyal to our 
government.”32
28 Ibidem.
29 D.D. Eisenhower to Trustees, Confidential, September 20, CACU.
30 When D.D. Eisenhower thanked Professor Henry Steele Commager for sending him 
the “San Francisco Examiner,” he had written: “The Hearst papers, of course, have made no at-
tempt to get the facts. They have said worse things about me than appear in the article you sent.” 
July 29, PDDE, X, p. 171; D.D. Eisenhower to Trustees, Confidential, September 20, CACU.
31 Ibidem; A.C. Jacobs, “Memoirs,” op. cit., p. 165.















Before Coleman left Columbia in late August, he spoke to an audience 
of 250 people at an event sponsored by the National Committee of Ameri-
cans of Polish descent. At Columbia “an atmosphere and a climate” has been 
created “which in itself constitutes a flagrant and outright denial of academ-
ic freedom.” The Slavic Department, he declared, had a goal of receiving an 
annual subsidy of $100,000 from the Soviet Union, which Columbia denied 
immediately, and he quoted Simmons as saying: “Then we will have a real de-
partment.” The “World-Telegram” article reminded its readers that “Coun-
terattack” recently had accused Simmons of being “one of the leading fellow-
travelers in American colleges.”33
At registration in September a dozen students picketed, and placards 
asked “What can Kridl teach us?” and urged boycotting Kirdl’s classes. Yet, 
a mere dozen protesters seldom gather attention at Columbia; in fact, the 
demonstration paled in comparison to the Howard Fast protests and, especial-
ly, to the campus reaction to the tuition increase. Still, Coleman and Sluska 
had undermined the Polish Studies program for many in the Polish-American 
and émigré communities. Kirdl faced a challengeand, as Stanislaus Blejwas 
observed, his “tenure was a fruitful one in the history of Polish Studies in the 
United States.”34
For Coleman and the PAC, their timing was unfortunate. There is little 
evidence that Coleman, a very junior and little known member of the liber-
al arts faculty, attracted a following on the Columbia campus. The “New York 
Times” article on June 1st, mentioning the PAC telegram to Eisenhower, had 
arrived on Commencement Day. Thus, Coleman’s protest began, ignited by 
Sluszka and the PAC, as students had departed or were departing, and the fac-
ulty was thinking about summer projects and plans. For the Provost, however, 
the media controversy became prominent. While he never had any question 
about Columbia accepting the Chair and Polish funding, when Coleman 
chose to present his demands on July 9 he turned his back, once and for all, 
on the program with which he had worked for twenty-two years.
The controversy in the press, however, had prompted several officials to 
consider a different course. Fackenthal, who had accepted the Polish propos-
al, soon backtracked and proposed a compromise on Polish funding. The Di-
rector of Public Information later emphatically recalled: “I still think it was 
not a smart thing to do and that it cost us more than $10,000 a year in pub-
lic opinion.” Yet, would abandoning Winiewicz’s offer also lead to terminat-
ing the Masaryk Chair, especially after the communist coup in Prague? More 
important, would not cancelling the two Chairs diminish Columbia’s Slavic 
33 “World-Telegram,” August 16 [in:] C.W. Ackerman MS., Library of Congress; “New 
York Times,” August 16 and 17.
34 S.J. Blejwas, Adam Michiewicz Chair..., op. cit., p. 435, 438.














Programs? Wasson had emphasized Columbia’s challenge in his confidential 
letter to the Provost. “The whole history and culture of Eastern Europe is un-
familiar to us Americans, that in our own interest we must make up for this 
ignorance as fast as we can.” This is the most “pressing area for expansion of 
top level studies in the humanities,” and Columbia’s achievements are unique 
in this field. “There is no such center in all the Russias (...) only in Columbia 
is there promise of an adequate program. The further intensification and ex-
pansion of these Slavic studies (...) will enable our University to render illus-
trious service.”35
As for Eisenhower, he had been at Columbia only a few weeks when the 
controversy began. We know the criticism bothered him, and he found him-
self in a position at Columbia for which he had literally no experience. While 
we do not know what he specifically thought about the controversy, a few ex-
cerpts from his letter to the “Times” Arthur Sulzberger on July 29 are inter-
esting for being non-committal. He reminded Sulzberger that everything had 
happened before his arrival, except “the formal acceptance” of Coleman’s res-
ignation. “I have studied” the Mackiewicz Chair “matter enough to know 
that we are in the middle of an argument of which the sources can scarcely 
be traced,” but he added they were not “exclusively in support of democracy” 
or the promulgation of “communist ideology.” He added: “I do not pretend, 
of course, at this time, to express an opinion on the merits of the argument 
pro and con regarding Professor Coleman.” His personal staff, especially his 
speech writer, always did everything possible to protect him from bad pub-
licity and, in this case, to minimize his involvement. For the Provost, Cole-
man and the media controversy had been prominent throughout the summer. 
From his meeting with the PAC over Memorial Day Weekend to his session 
with Coleman and the media protest led, by the Hearst and anti-communist 
newspapers, the Provost supported the University’s commitment.
In the summer of 1948 that meant establishing the Adam Mickiewicz 
Chair with Professor Manfred Kridl holding the Chair and contributing to 
the furthering of Polish-American Studies in America. Years later, the Provost 
recalled: “I think we came out with a plus.”
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